Not Without Incident: Questioning Big Brother's Platitudes

“Even the finest sword plunged into salt water will eventually rust.”[i]– Sun Tzu

I have been extremely critical of Donald Trump’s foreign policy so far. Most of his foreign policy has been a total disaster, from the Iran war to his threats to invade Cuba and Greenland, he has operated as brutish imperialist, trading the soft, polite despotism of the illiberal liberal class, exemplified by the Obama and Biden regimes, for naked imperialism. This shift was presented in the National Security Strategy published in 2025, where there is a declared shift in focus from the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific to Latin America.[ii] Despite the Trump regime’s already atrocious and destructive record, there is a bright spot. He has been better on China than he was in his first term, and Biden. It has not been a raving success, as the same problems that plague Trump’s foreign policy elsewhere, namely incoherence and improvisation, worsened by Trump and most of his advisers being complete ignoramus, plague his approach to China. However, Trump has moved away from any firm commitments to Taiwan and has even withheld an arms sale to Taiwan.[iii]

In his most recent meeting with Xi Jinping, he refused to say whether the US would defend Taiwan, saying “I don’t want to say that” he said. “I’m not going to say that. There’s only one person that knows that. You know who it is? Me. I’m the only person. That question was asked to me today by President Xi. I said, “I don’t talk about those things.”[iv] Trump’s pause on the arms sale to Taiwan, together with his refusal to commit to its defense, has rocked the foreign policy blob in Washington. There are fears that Trump will abandon Taiwan, and claims that Trump’s withholding of arms sales to Taiwan are a “gift to Xi Jinping” This outrage is unsurprising, but it is the very people decrying Trump’s pause that must be resisted at all costs, as what they are vying for is a policy that is not only antithetical to America First, but is likely to lead to, in a best case scenario, a humiliating defeat for America and a crisis that forces it to accept the new reality of a multipolar world. Foreign policy analysts like David Sacks, Richard Haass, Ryan Haass, Elbridge Colby, and numerous others would rather ship arms to and spend lump sums on the defense of not just Taiwan, but on other allies like the Philippines and South Korea in preparation for a war over Taiwan, than focus on America and its people.[v]

Countless articles written by the illiberal liberal class are littered with tired references to freedom, liberation, and democracy, citing the plight of the Taiwanese people in the face of Chinese tyranny, however, just like it should be up to the Cubans, Iranians, and the Venezuelan people to determine their own political future, so it should be up to the Taiwanese people to decide their fate.[vi]

Donald Trump had a conversation with Xi Jinping following a spat between Japan and China over remarks the newly elected Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, made about Taiwan.[vii] She said that if China invaded or imposed a blockade on the island, then Japan would see it as an existential threat, and it would intervene militarily.[viii] Trump also spoke with Takaichi, affirming US support for Japan and status quo in the Taiwan Strait, however, Trump himself has said very little about Taiwan. In his Truth Social post about his phone call with Jinping, he did not mention Taiwan, which for Jinping was the focal point of their conversation, especially since it has been absent from their previous meetings and discussions and it is at the heart of China’s current spat with Japan. Trump, unlike his predecessors, has been critical of Taiwan, mainly of its semiconductor industry. Earlier this year he threatened TSMC with tariffs, as, in his view, Taiwan stole manufacturing jobs from the US.[ix] In March 2025 TSMC announced plans to invest 100 billion dollars into a semiconductor campus in Arizona, and this ignited fears in Taiwan that the US would take its semiconductor industry.[x] There was outrage as well. Former president of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou accused TSMC of selling out and paying Trump a “protection fee.” This relates to Trump’s insistence that Taiwan needs to pay more for their own defense.[xi] Taiwan spends about 3% of its GDP on defense, and Trump has demanded that they increase this figure to 10%. In a 2024 interview with Bloomberg, when asked if he would defend Taiwan, he said “I know the people very well, respect them greatly. They did take about 100% of our chip business. I think Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.”[xii] In other words, it is uncertain whether Trump would intervene to defend Taiwan. It is likely that Japan is so confident because they are assuming that the US will assist them. Whenever Trump has been asked directly if he would help defend Taiwan, he has declined to comment and give a direct response. This is a contrast to Joe Biden, who said at three different times that yes, the US would defend Taiwan, after which his aides had to mop up his mess, assuring China that their commitment to strategic ambiguity had not changed.[xiii]

While Biden seemed to shift away from strategic ambiguity towards strategic clarity, where the US/West declares a position on Taiwan instead of talking out of both sides of their mouths, Trump appears to be a return to the decades long project of strategic ambiguity, a position that is not having a position. This may irk Taiwanese separatists, like the new PM Lai Ching-te, who said in a speech earlier this year that “Of course Taiwan is a country,”, and “But China says no, that Taiwan is not a sovereign country.” It is not just China that says this, it is almost every country in the world. That is why Western news articles refer to Taiwan as a “self-governing island” or an “island democracy”, but never a country.[xiv] Ching-te said this in a ten-part series of speeches in which he argues that Taiwan and China have developed separately, and that they are not nor have they ever been controlled by China, and outside of a brief period of 8 years, their territory has never been part of China’s.[xv] This is bunk. Whether they like it or not, as of now, Taiwan is part of China. If they want to separate, then they must hold a referendum. Ching-te is even more pro-independence than his predecessors, who all avoided saying that Taiwan is a country. At first, the Trump regime appeared to be returning to the dangerously aimless policy of strategic ambiguity, and with an ardent separatist in Taipei, the risk of war over Taiwan is nigh inevitable. This is a war that the US and its allies will not win, and could result in nuclear Armageddon at worst, and at best, astronomical destruction.

The issue of China and Taiwan is one where the illiberal liberal and illiberal classes converge, however, it is unclear whether Trump would provide direct military support to Taiwan, as some scholars and officials have called for. There are some worries that Trump may “abandon” Taiwan, and debate over Trump’s position on Taiwan in a contingency is almost always split between two extremes, that he either fully supports Taiwan, or he will completely abandon them. There are, however, other potential scenarios. Josh Hoang-Wilkes writes that as well as these two extreme scenarios, “There is a third, more ambiguous path: Trump could tell Taiwan that it has America’s continued support but not only does it need to keep building foundries in the U.S., Taiwan also needs to find a way to talk to China and reduce tensions.”[xvi] Judging by Ching-te’s hostility towards China, it is unlikely that his regime will do this. Trump needs to cut off arms sales to Taiwan immediately, and end strategic ambiguity, which is in practice strategic inanity. Instead of shifting to strategic clarity of recognition of Taiwan, affirm what they have been held to for decades, that there is one China, and that is the PRC.

Perhaps Trump can correct Jimmy Carter’s mistake of signing the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) after recognizing the PRC as China, and nullifying Taiwan, or as its officially called, the ROC.[xvii] The TRA established “unofficial” relations with Taiwan, and under this guise the US has funneled weapons, technology, and provided training to Taiwan’s military. Although it would be the right move, certainly for peace, Trump will not do it because he’s a thin skinned, egotistical, insecure coward. His cabinet, like those before him, is stuffed with China hawks. The US government, as well as all the think tanks lavishly funded by the arms industry, like Brookings and the CFR, are licking their lips at the prospect of war with China. Universities and academia perpetuate the narrative that China is an aggressor and threat to US hegemony, and that this must be countered at all costs. It is refreshing to see Trump make a true deviation from the US establishment, even if it is only temporary.

It is not certain whether Trump’s current position on Taiwan and China is officially US policy, as they could radically change in 1 hour, and Trump operates on a whim, not based on a set of principles or a coherent ideology. What a few analysts propose, a guarantee that the US will not defend Taiwan, and that they do not support its independence, but will still send it weapons and bolster deterrence, is a start, however, it is still hampered by the same contradictions that hinder the proposals for strategic clarity that is in reality not strategic clarity, but a reaffirmation of the position that there is one China, coupled with a continued commitment to arming Taiwan.[xviii] The foreign policy sages in Washington are outraged that Trump is treating Taiwan like a pawn in his transactions with Beijing.

Jennifer Kavanagh makes a very important and ignored point when she writes that “The United States, which for decades has made decisions based on what policymakers thought America should do, will be forced to consider what the United States can do”[xix] She argues that the US has two choices, managed retrenchment or forced retrenchment. This echoes a statement by Tucker Carlson, who said in an interview with The Economist that the US cannot defend Taiwan, and that it is not a matter of whether the US should defend Taiwan but can it.[xx] He noted that power has limits.

The idea of the US as a democracy promoter, a ‘force for good’, the world’s policeman, a beacon of freedom, is so entrenched in Washington’s foreign policy blob that the very notion that they may be unable to both sustain their empire and defeat China in a war over Taiwan is unthinkable. Rather than debate the question of whether the US and the West should intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, a ‘country’ that until such a point was not seen as a country by all but 12 nations in the world, there are debates over how Taiwan should be defended, not on whether it should be.[xxi] The fundamental question of its status is glossed over, as it always has been. It is simply implied that it is a country, even though we do not see it as a country and we supposedly abide by One China policy.

Trump needs to go further than just withhold a single arms sale or not formally commit to Taiwan’s defense with Xi; he needs to go even further than what Kavanagh proposes. He needs to not only say that the US will not defend Taiwan nor recognize its independence but affirm what the US has claimed to affirm for decades now, that Taiwan is part of China. Thus, unification would not be an invasion or act of aggression, it would be well within China’s rights to assert authority over its territory. After such a statement, the US can then lead a referendum on Taiwan’s behalf if they want, where they vote on independence. This would fulfill what is stated in the San Francisco Treaty, where the Taiwanese people determine their status. As of now, Taiwan is part of China.

The US policy on Taiwan remains strategic inanity. Until this changes, a catastrophic war looms. The limits of US power have already been exposed, not just in Iran but across many decades, from Vietnam to Afghanistan. Strategic inanity is suicidal for the American empire and such a shallow, contradiction riddled strategy will ensure a humiliating loss over Taiwan, not a victory, even if there is a demagogue like Trump and his cultists who cry triumph in the face of blatant defeat. Trump has done the permanent regime’s bidding the whole time he has been in government, but with Taiwan, he may now be resisting them, however, this could be short lived and by the time this is published, he could already have changed his mind. Despite this uncertainty, I must give credit where it is due, Washington’s delusion on Taiwan must be probed and debated, not mindlessly affirmed by think tank zombies.

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[i] Tzu Sun et al., The Art of War, 29. Aufl, Oxford Paperbacks (Oxford Univ. Press, 1971).

[ii] Emily Harding, The National Security Strategy: The Good, the Not So Great, and the Alarm Bells, December 5, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/national-security-strategy-good-not-so-great-and-alarm-bells.

[iii] Military Times Staff, “US Congress Approves Money for Taiwan Defense. Does It Mean Trump Is Done Hesitating?,” Defense News, July 27, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2026/07/27/us-congress-approves-money-for-taiwan-defense-does-it-mean-trump-is-done-hesitating/; Jonathan Fritz and Michael Clark, “The Trump Administration’s Taiwan Arms Freeze Is a Gift to Xi Jinping,” Center for American Progress, June 3, 2026, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-trump-administrations-taiwan-arms-freeze-is-a-gift-to-xi-jinping/.

[iv] Gregory Svirnovskiy, “Trump Noncommittal to Continued Taiwan Arms Sales after Meeting with Xi,” POLITICO, May 5, 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/15/trump-taiwan-arm-sales-00923280.

[v] Richard Haass and David Sacks, “China Could Win Taiwan Without Fighting,” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/china-could-win-taiwan-without-fighting; Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous; Hamish McDonald, “Careless Trump Raises the Stakes for Taiwan,” Inside Story, June 5, 2026, https://insidestory.org.au/careless-trump-raises-the-stakes-for-taiwan/.

[vi] United States of America, “UNTC,” United Nations Treaty Collection, August 21, 1952, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801528c2.

[vii] Mike Mochizuki, “First Female Japan PM Takes Hawkish Position on China, Taiwan,” accessed August 31, 2026, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/sanae-takaichi-japan/.

[viii] Mike Mochizuki, “First Female Japan PM Takes Hawkish Position on China, Taiwan.”

[ix] David Sacks, “Trump Is Making Taiwan More Vulnerable | Council on Foreign Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 21, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/trump-making-taiwan-more-vulnerable; Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Trump Turned Chilly Toward Taiwan,” The American Conservative, April 9, 2026, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-trump-turned-chilly-toward-taiwan/; Wayne Chang, “Taiwan Stole America’s Chip Industry According to Trump. But That’s Not True | CNN Business,” CNN, July 25, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/23/tech/trump-taiwan-tsmc-chips-industry-hnk-intl.

[x] Howard Lutnick, “Trump Administration Secures an Additional $100 Billion U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Investment for a Total of $265 Billion from TSMC | U.S. Department of Commerce,” July 16, 2026, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2026/07/trump-administration-secures-additional-100-billion-us-semiconductor; Thomas Shattuck, The Return to Strategic Ambiguity: Assessing Trump’s Taiwan Stance – Foreign Policy Research Institute, Analysis, May 7, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/05/the-return-to-strategic-ambiguity-assessing-trumps-taiwan-stance/; Wayne Chang and John Liu, “Fear and Resignation after ‘World’s Most Powerful Company’ Pays Trump a $100 Billion ‘Protection Fee’ | CNN Business,” CNN, March 13, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/13/tech/taiwan-tsmc-us-investment-reactions-intl-hnk.

[xi] Helen Davidson, “Trump Says Taiwan Should Pay the US for Its Defence as ‘It Doesn’t Give Us Anything,’” World News, The Guardian, July 17, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/17/donald-trump-taiwan-pay-us-defence-china-national-convention.

[xii] Victor Llorente, “Donald Trump’s Bloomberg Businessweek Interview: Complete Text,” Bloomberg.Com, n.d., accessed August 31, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-trump-interview-transcript/.

[xiii] Thomas Shattuck, “Assessing Joe Biden’s Long (and Complicated) Taiwan Legacy,” Global Taiwan Institute, February 5, 2025, https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/02/assessing-joe-bidens-long-and-complicated-taiwan-legacy/.

[xiv] Nathan Attrill, “Every Day Is Independence Day in Taiwan,” The Strategist, July 1, 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/every-day-is-independence-day-in-taiwan/.

[xv] David Sacks, “Reading Lai Ching-Te’s National Day Speech and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations | Council on Foreign Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/articles/reading-lai-ching-tes-national-day-speech-and-its-implications-cross-strait-relations.

[xvi] Josh Hoang-Wilkes, “Trump Has Not Yet Turned to Taiwan,” Domino Theory, May 19, 2025, https://dominotheory.com/trump-has-not-yet-turned-to-taiwan/.

[xvii] Dean Karalekas, “The Taiwan Relations Act: Celebrating 45 Years of Confusion,” Domino Theory, April 15, 2024, https://dominotheory.com/the-taiwan-relations-act-celebrating-45-years-of-confusion/.

[xviii] Jennifer Kavanagh, “The Iran War and the Future of American Empire,” The American Conservative, June 8, 2026, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-iran-war-and-the-future-of-american-empire/.

[xix] Kavanagh, “The Iran War and the Future of American Empire.”

[xx] The Economist et al., A Full-Length Interview with Tucker Carlson | The Economist, 2026, 55:38, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpnTQzPHewQ.

[xxi] For a full overview of how various countries view Taiwan’s political status, see: International Institute for Strategi Studies, “Lawfare: Varying National Approaches to the Recognition of Taiwan,” IISS, accessed August 31, 2026, https://www.iiss.org/charting-china/2025/01/varying-national-approaches-to-the-recognition-of-taiwan/.

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References

Attrill, Nathan. “Every Day Is Independence Day in Taiwan.” The Strategist, July 1, 2025. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/every-day-is-independence-day-in-taiwan/.

Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Why Trump Turned Chilly Toward Taiwan.” The American Conservative, April 9, 2026. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-trump-turned-chilly-toward-taiwan/.

David Sacks. “Reading Lai Ching-Te’s National Day Speech and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations | Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/articles/reading-lai-ching-tes-national-day-speech-and-its-implications-cross-strait-relations.

David Sacks. “Trump Is Making Taiwan More Vulnerable | Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, February 21, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/articles/trump-making-taiwan-more-vulnerable.

Davidson, Helen. “Trump Says Taiwan Should Pay the US for Its Defence as ‘It Doesn’t Give Us Anything.’” World News. The Guardian, July 17, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/17/donald-trump-taiwan-pay-us-defence-china-national-convention.

Gregory Svirnovskiy. “Trump Noncommittal to Continued Taiwan Arms Sales after Meeting with Xi.” POLITICO, May 5, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/15/trump-taiwan-arm-sales-00923280.

Haass, Richard, and David Sacks. “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous.” Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous.

Haass, Richard, and David Sacks. “China Could Win Taiwan Without Fighting.” Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2026. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/china-could-win-taiwan-without-fighting.

Hamish McDonald. “Careless Trump Raises the Stakes for Taiwan.” Inside Story, June 5, 2026. https://insidestory.org.au/careless-trump-raises-the-stakes-for-taiwan/.

Harding, Emily. The National Security Strategy: The Good, the Not So Great, and the Alarm Bells. December 5, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/national-security-strategy-good-not-so-great-and-alarm-bells.

Hoang-Wilkes, Josh. “Trump Has Not Yet Turned to Taiwan.” Domino Theory, May 19, 2025. https://dominotheory.com/trump-has-not-yet-turned-to-taiwan/.

Howard Lutnick. “Trump Administration Secures an Additional $100 Billion U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Investment for a Total of $265 Billion from TSMC | U.S. Department of Commerce.” July 16, 2026. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2026/07/trump-administration-secures-additional-100-billion-us-semiconductor.

International Institute for Strategi Studies. “Lawfare: Varying National Approaches to the Recognition of Taiwan.” IISS. Accessed August 31, 2026. https://www.iiss.org/charting-china/2025/01/varying-national-approaches-to-the-recognition-of-taiwan/.

Jonathan Fritz and Michael Clark. “The Trump Administration’s Taiwan Arms Freeze Is a Gift to Xi Jinping.” Center for American Progress, June 3, 2026. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-trump-administrations-taiwan-arms-freeze-is-a-gift-to-xi-jinping/.

Karalekas, Dean. “The Taiwan Relations Act: Celebrating 45 Years of Confusion.” Domino Theory, April 15, 2024. https://dominotheory.com/the-taiwan-relations-act-celebrating-45-years-of-confusion/.

Kavanagh, Jennifer. “The Iran War and the Future of American Empire.” The American Conservative, June 8, 2026. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-iran-war-and-the-future-of-american-empire/.

Llorente, Victor. “Donald Trump’s Bloomberg Businessweek Interview: Complete Text.” Bloomberg.Com, n.d. Accessed August 31, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-trump-interview-transcript/.

Mike Mochizuki. “First Female Japan PM Takes Hawkish Position on China, Taiwan.” Accessed August 31, 2026. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/sanae-takaichi-japan/.

Military Times Staff. “US Congress Approves Money for Taiwan Defense. Does It Mean Trump Is Done Hesitating?” Defense News, July 27, 2026. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2026/07/27/us-congress-approves-money-for-taiwan-defense-does-it-mean-trump-is-done-hesitating/.

Sun, Tzu, Samuel B. Griffith, Liddell Hart, and Henry Basil. The Art of War. 29. Aufl. Oxford Paperbacks. Oxford Univ. Press, 1971.

The Economist, Zanny Minton Beddoes, and Tucker Carlson. A Full-Length Interview with Tucker Carlson | The Economist. 2026. 55:38. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpnTQzPHewQ.

Thomas Shattuck. “Assessing Joe Biden’s Long (and Complicated) Taiwan Legacy.” Global Taiwan Institute, February 5, 2025. https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/02/assessing-joe-bidens-long-and-complicated-taiwan-legacy/.

Thomas Shattuck. The Return to Strategic Ambiguity: Assessing Trump’s Taiwan Stance – Foreign Policy Research Institute. Analysis. May 7, 2025. https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/05/the-return-to-strategic-ambiguity-assessing-trumps-taiwan-stance/.

United States of America. “UNTC.” United Nations Treaty Collection, August 21, 1952. https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801528c2.

Wayne Chang. “Taiwan Stole America’s Chip Industry According to Trump. But That’s Not True | CNN Business.” CNN, July 25, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/23/tech/trump-taiwan-tsmc-chips-industry-hnk-intl.

Wayne Chang and John Liu. “Fear and Resignation after ‘World’s Most Powerful Company’ Pays Trump a $100 Billion ‘Protection Fee’ | CNN Business.” CNN, March 13, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/13/tech/taiwan-tsmc-us-investment-reactions-intl-hnk.